region exceeded the capacity of the existing patchwork of communications infrastructure largely managed by private companies that supported the public agencies engaged in this response.
Hurricane Katrina affected an extraordinarily large geographic area with a wide range of communities and infrastructures exposed to risk. In the critical hours before and after Katrina made landfall slightly east of New Orleans, Louisiana, on August 29, 2005, at 6:10 a.m., access to timely, valid communications to assess and report the rapidly changing conditions in these communities was essential for coordinated action among the jurisdictions and organizations legally responsible for protecting life and property. With 1.5 million people at risk in the Gulf Coast region, there was no more important function for emergency managers than communications. The task of mobilizing a coherent, coordinated warning and response system for this catastrophic storm was massively complex.
The communications infrastructure needed to support intergovernmental decision making to enable communities to respond effectively to such a wide-ranging, rapidly moving, destructive storm was not in place. Consequently, when communications failed totally for the City of New Orleans under the brunt of hurricane winds and subsequent flooding, managers of emergency service organizations, businesses, and nonprofit organizations such as schools, hospitals, and nursing homes lost their capacity to coordinate action in collective response to the spreading danger. Without timely updates and clear reports on the status of operations at different locations, the enormity of the problem was beyond the comprehension of the personnel on duty at city, state, and federal levels of responsibility. Personnel had no means by which to integrate reports from multiple locations to create a regionwide profile of the event or to assess accurately the escalating destruction, let alone mobilize coordinated action against the rapidly growing threat.
In the absence of timely, valid communications, organizations cannot function effectively under the urgent stress of disaster. Individuals are left to make their best guesses about risk and safety, rumors spread wildly, and available skills and resources are overlooked as personnel search hurriedly for workable strategies of action. The collapse of interorganizational response to Hurricane Katrina was regrettably apparent when the existing communications infrastructure failed. This fact was acknowledged by Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco when she stated that "the big problem [in managing disaster response] was that the communications network was down. The day after the storm, cell phones, blackberries, and landlines were useless at the moment when coordination among many branches of government was critical," (Maggi, 2005) . The challenge to practicing managers and researchers in the aftermath of this devastating event is to acknowledge communications as a primary requirement for collective action and to build a communications infrastructure that enables personnel at different levels of responsibility and authority to adapt their actions reciprocally in accordance with rapidly changing conditions. Building capacity for collective action for broad regions exposed to threat, such as the Gulf Coast in Hurricane Katrina, requires technical investment and social organization.
Initial Conditions for Communications Processes in Disaster Environments
Without explicit design, communications processes in environments exposed to significant disaster risk encounter serious constraints. First, there is the continuing uncertainty of risk, what constitutes the threat, if or when it will occur, and its probable impact on different components of the community. Second, known information regarding communities at risk may vary in accuracy, extent of coverage, and validity. Third, the hazard may threaten diverse populations and types of infrastructure that function interdependently within a large region, creating complex conditions for continuity of operations. Fourth, the economic costs of disaster are likely to vary for groups of the population that have different margins of reserve. Determining what levels of risk, if any, are "acceptable" for which groups may diminish credibility for public organizations. Finally, in a large and varied region with many jurisdictions The task of mobilizing a coherent, coordinated warning and response system for this catastrophic storm was massively complex.
and multiple organizations that have legal responsibilities in disaster conditions, it is essential to create a common knowledge base regarding exposure to risk for the region. Different organizations may not know or understand the level of risk to which their community is exposed, or what resources may be available under common threat. Explicit knowledge regarding exposure to danger and appropriate behavior under threat that would facilitate collective action may not be widely shared.
Under these conditions, emergency managers act with only the knowledge available to them. To improve performance, it is necessary to increase the range, frequency, and access to information sources, as well as feedback from the different constituencies exposed to different levels of threat. This exchange of information is critical as it allows a continuous process of updating the changing status of a community under stress. Communications need to be operational not only among the component actors of the affected region but also among potential donors and supportive participants in the emerging response system. The response system extends a widening circle of support, feedback, and correction of error that needs to be focused on specific problems, yet simultaneously provide an overall status of the community.
This dynamic process of information exchange allows reciprocal adaptation among participants as they learn the limitations and strengths of their fellow actors in the set of shared tasks. Under the urgent stress of disaster, this process of communication cannot be left to chance; it is necessarily a product of design. The concept of informed collective action functions consistently only when supported by a well-designed information system that facilitates information search and exchange among responsible organizations under dynamic conditions.
Communications Infrastructure in Disaster Response
The need for interoperability of communications systems in disaster response is a wellknown problem. It has long been identified as a primary requirement for increasing performance among first-response agencies (Comfort, 2005) . Given the costly breakdown in communications between the New York City Police and Fire Departments in response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, interoperability is now included as a priority in the National Incident Management System (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2004 ). Yet implementation of interoperability in communications systems among organizations with emergency responsibilities has lagged in practice, and it was regrettably absent among the range of local, state, and federal organizations responding to the threat of Hurricane Katrina.
The persistent difficulty in designing and implementing communications infrastructure to support timely exchange of information among multiple jurisdictions and organizations in rapidly escalating disaster operations is caused by technical and organizational constraints. Technically, there is a scarcity of bandwidth for radio communications, and concern for the security of critical information that may be accessed over airwaves by unauthorized persons. Organizationally, there is reluctance among first-response organizations to share scarce bandwidth with personnel outside their immediate range of operations. This reluctance intensifies across jurisdictional boundaries, when local organizations need to communicate secure information with state or federal organizations. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, this situation was compounded by the extraordinary destruction wrought by the disaster to the physical communications infrastructure.
In New Orleans, for example, ordinary telephone service was cut by the hurricane-force winds and rising water. Electrical transmission lines were down, and no electronic communications were functioning. Cellular phone base stations were flooded, rendering cell phones inoperable. Satellite phones were nonfunctional during and immediately after the storm. In the first 3 days following Katrina's landfall, there was essentially no reliable means of communication among the range of local, state, and federal organizations seeking to coordinate their actions from different jurisdictional levels of authority. Valiant efforts were made to establish communications; however, the units were either too large, such as the FEMA mobile
Discrepancies Between Disaster Plans and Actual Practice
The sobering contrast between carefully written and rehearsed disaster operations plans and actual performance of multiorganizational response systems under the stress of a catastrophic event such as Hurricane Katrina compels review of human cognitive capacity and the technical and organizational means of supporting this action. Hurricane Katrina provided the first major test of the newly established Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the revised National Response Plan and National Incident Management System (FEMA, 2004) that were intended to make the nation safer and more secure. DHS, hastily assembled following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, had kept its focus on terrorism. Consequently, the personnel selected for leadership positions in the new department had little experience in natural disasters, and less scientific knowledge of the conditions that contribute to the formation and escalation of natural disasters. FEMA, which had been an independent agency with cabinet status during the 1990s, was folded into the larger DHS, along with 21 other federal agencies. Many experienced disaster managers, noting the shift in the agency's priorities, left the agency, reluctant to participate in the dismantling of a program of disaster mitigation, or reduction of risk before disaster occurs, that they had built.
In this climate of organizational redefinition and change, the capacity of FEMA as an organization that served as the coordinator of resources and response to communities at risk was seriously eroded through reduction in funding for mitigation, management, and training for natural disasters. Although DHS formally adopted an all-hazards approach to planning for disaster response, the capacity to implement those plans in a smoothly functioning, intergovernmental response system to serve a large, diverse, and risk-prone nation was not developed.
At least five major discrepancies between policy and practice were apparent in the intergovernmental response system that evolved following Hurricane Katrina. None of these discrepancies is new. All have been acknowledged and documented many times before (Comfort, 1999; Comfort, Hauskrecht, & Lin, 2005; Holland, 1995; Mileti, 1999) . These five discrepancies include
• the gap between human cognitive capacity to comprehend the complex interactions among the physical environment of cities, their built infrastructure, and human interaction and the level of risk that can be generated by these interacting systems • the gap between the construction of effective infrastructure systems that integrate lifeline systems of electrical power, communications, transportation, gas, water and sewage distribution, and the investment and resources needed to maintain these technical systems under a steady erosion of physical wear and human action Comfort, Haase / HURRICANE KATRINA AND COMMUNICATION 331 A large proportion of the interorganizational collapse was due to the lack of a 'common operating picture' that could only be developed with effective, timely communications.
• the gap between organizational design and the investment in resources and training to enable personnel to carry out the intended functions of their organizations that have responsibility for risk reduction and response • the gap between public perception of risk and the capacity to take actions to reduce risk at multiple levels-household, workplace, community, governmental authorities • the gap between the diversity of actors and varied components in an emergency response system and the capacity to integrate the skills and knowledge of these different actors into a coherent, effective emergency response system.
In the language of complexity theorists, Hurricane Katrina was a "symmetry-shattering event" (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) ; that is, some events are so powerful that they shatter the existing conceptions of social and political organization and create an opportunity for rearranging the components of society in a new way. Recognition that Katrina precipitated known vulnerabilities in the geography, infrastructure, and capacity of the Gulf Coast cities that, unattended, led to extraordinary losses in lives and property 2 compels a reexamination of the conditions that led to this outcome. Such an inquiry is even more critical to a nation such as the United States that commands the technical capacity, organizational skills, and resources to reduce disaster risk. The consequences of this storm have been so massive, the costs so high, the flaws in public preparedness and management of risk so blatant that none can claim that change is not needed. The difficult task is determining what that change should be, and how it can address the known gaps in the reduction of disaster risk.
Addressing the gap in cognitive capacity of policy makers and practitioners to comprehend the destructive power of natural phenomena is the first step toward constructive action. To do so, it is useful to document the kinds of actions that policy makers and emergency response agencies took in reference to Katrina, and when and under what conditions coordination failed. Looking for a daily record of actions undertaken to cope with this event, we conducted a content analysis of news reported in the Times Picayune, the major New Orleans newspaper that continued publication throughout the disaster, albeit from Baton Rouge. Through the content analysis, we identified all organizations that participated in the response operations to Hurricane Katrina and the interactions among them. This set of organizations made up a response system of organizations seeking to protect lives, protect property, and maintain continuity of operations within the affected area. We used these data to characterize the response network and to analyze the relationships among them, using the software program, UCINET. This analysis will inform the discussion of the other four gaps observed in disaster response management and serve as a guide to redrawing strategies for protecting urban environments.
Characteristics of the Katrina Response System
The size and diversity of the organizations involved in response operations for Hurricane Katrina are significant. Table 1 shows the composition of the response system that evolved during a period of 24 days-3 days before the hurricane made landfall east of New Orleans, and 21 days following. Table 1 documents this large response organization, 535 organizations in total, with the largest number, 305, or 57%, identified as public organizations. It is interesting that the breakdown by jurisdiction shows the largest number of public organizations, 146, or 47.9%, were from the subregional, parish, and municipal levels, in contrast to 69 organizations, or 22.6%, from the national level. State organizations, 78, made up 25.6% of the public organizations. The dominance of local organizations in the public sector contrasted with the majority of national organizations, 75, or 52.4%, in the private sector. The nonprofit sector made up the smallest group of organizations, with a majority, 44, or 52.3%, identified as local organizations. It is also noteworthy that a small but significant number of international organizations, 20, or 3.7% of the total number of 535 organizations, participated in the response system. The special interest groups identified were political parties that did not fit easily into any one of 332 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / April 2006 the other three categories. Given the size and diversity of this set of response organizations, the demand on communications infrastructure for coordinating response was extraordinarily high. Table 2 presents the number of organizations that interacted during response operations to provide search-and-rescue services, medical care, shelter, welfare, and other assistance to the population of the devastated region. This profile of organizations that interacted with one another in the conduct of response operations documents the problem of communications, and the difficulty in achieving effective coordination. The total number of organizations interacting with others drops by more than 200, from 535 to 318. Of this smaller set of interacting organizations, almost two thirds, 201, or 63.2%, were public organizations, whereas private organizations, 73, or 23%, made up the next largest group. Again, the striking contrast between these two sectors is that the majority of public organizations participating in response, 106, or 52.7%, were local-sub-regional, parish, and city-whereas the majority of private organizations, 47, or 64.4%, were national and regional. Nonprofit organizations made up the smallest group of interacting organizations, with local organizations constituting the largest segment, 25, or 58.7%. The set of organizations can be considered a network of organizations engaged in response operations.
To examine the interactions among the organizations in more detail, we conducted an analysis of this response system using the UCINET software for network analysis (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002) . To make this large network of 318 organizations more manageable for network analysis, we grouped several subsets of organizations into larger categories. For example, all K-12 schools in the affected area were grouped into the category Local Schools. All hospitals were grouped into the category Local Hospitals. All airlines flying into Louis Armstrong International Airport were grouped into the category Airlines. All National Guard units were grouped into the category Guard. This effort reduced the total number of organizations to 251, which maintained the basic characteristics of the network. More telling in terms of the performance of the response system as a whole is the time at which organizations from different sectors and jurisdictions entered into the disaster response system. Figure 1 depicts the frequency of reported interactions among organizations engaged in disaster response activities for the 24-day period of the study by jurisdiction, as cited in the Times Picayune (2005) . These data indicate the time of entry into the disaster response system. Figure 1 documents the early and intense interactions by the City organizations on Days 1 and 2 before landfall, and the later entry of federal organizations into the response system on September 1, 2005, 4 days after the storm and the breaching of the levees. Figure 2 shows the date of entry of organizations engaged with others into the disaster response system by sector. These graphs support the assertions of local emergency managers that they were operating largely alone in the days preceding the hurricane's landfall, despite requests for state and federal assistance, and similarly in the 2 days following landfall and the flooding. Significant federal assistance arrived only on September 1, 4 days after the hurricane made landfall and the levees breached Figure 3 shows the overall network of interaction among both jurisdictions and sectors among the 251 organizations interacting in response to the disaster. The graph shows a clustering of six to seven subnetworks in the central section of the larger network, with a wide arc of organizations that is tenuously linked to the central group by only 8 other organizations. These 8 linking organizations represent "cut points" within the network that, if broken, would 8 / 2 9 8 / 3 0 8 / 3 1 9 / 1 9 / 2 9 / 3 9 / 4 9 / 5 9 / 6 9 / 7 9 / 8 9 / 9 9 / 1 0 9 / 1 1 9 / 1 2 9 / 1 3 9 / 1 4 9 / 1 5 9 / 1 6 9 / 1 7 9 / 1 8 9 / 1 9 Date 8 / 2 7 8 / 2 8 8 / 2 9 8 / 3 0 8 / 3 1 9 / 1 9 / 2 9 / 3 9 / 4 9 / 5 9 / 6 9 / 7 9 / 8 9 / 9 9 / 1 0 9 / 1 1 9 / 1 2 9 / 1 3 9 / 1 4 9 / 1 5 9 / 1 6 9 / 1 7 9 / 1 8 9 / 1 9 Date disconnect the arc of organizations from the larger network. Indeed, the cut points also vary in importance. Four such organizations, Operations Life-Line Depot, U.S. Marines, American Red Cross, and U.S. Customs, maintain critical links to four other organizations, local media, City of Slidell, Houston Astrodome, and Catholic Charities USA. Breaking any one of these connections would disrupt the network. Clearly, organizations reached out to assist one another but did so more frequently within jurisdictions, instead of crossing jurisdictional levels as intended in the National Response Plan. These patterns document the asymmetry of information processes that was noted by managers at every jurisdictional level in the review of disaster operations in the weeks immediately after the event.
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An analysis of network centrality identifies those actors that are the most important in shaping the performance of the network, as they have the most ties with other actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, pp. 169-178) . Three types of centrality reveal interesting characteristics about this network: degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality. An analysis of degree centrality shows that 8 of the 251 organizations participating in the Katrina response network had the highest degree centrality; that is, these organizations were most frequently engaged in interactions with other actors in the network. These 8 organizations included FEMA, National Guard, president of the United States, governor of Louisiana, New Orleans Police Department, local hospitals, government of Jefferson Parish, and mayor, New Orleans. The descriptive statistics for an analysis of degree centrality are presented in Table 3 . The summary measure of centralization for the network is 15.96%, which indicates a loosely coupled network. Table 4 presents the measures for closeness centrality. Closeness centrality indicates how close an actor is to all other actors in the network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 183 ). This measure is useful in terms of estimating the flow of information through a network, assuming that if the actors are close to one another, the exchange of information occurs more quickly. Consequently, actors with the shortest paths to other actors (number of links needed to reach other actors) are likely to be more influential in the network. The summary statistics for closeness centrality show a very high mean for the measure of "farness," or distance among actors; that is, the findings show significant distance among the actors in the network, a condition that hinders rapid communication. The graph is unconnected, and no measure of centralization was calculated. The lack of connectedness shown by this analysis for the Katrina response network confirms the difficulty in achieving coordination in disaster operations A third measure of centrality for the network is betweenness centrality. Betweenness is a measure of the extent to which an actor lies in the direct path of communication exchange between two other actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, pp. 188-189) . Table 5 presents the findings from this measure of centrality.
The mean of betweenness for the network is 205.4; that is the mean number of possible paths for information to flow from one actor in the network to all others, while the maximum is 8,065.8. This is a substantial range and shows wide variation in the capacity of actors in the network to exchange information in a timely manner. The network centralization index is 25.36%, which is higher than the measure of degree centrality. This measure likely reflects the relatively high number of subnetworks, or clusters within the larger network of participating organizations
The network diagram shown in Figure 3 reveals a pattern of subsets of organizations engaged in response operations. These subsets appear to be effective means of accomplishing shared tasks, given the scope and severity of the disaster; however, they also confirm a lack of coherence for the larger network. Using UCINET, 35 cliques were identified within the larger network, as shown in Table 6 .
The composition of the cliques reveals an interesting pattern of interaction among the participating organizations. Cliques are subsets of organizations, often no more than three or four, that develop recurring patterns of interaction in the conduct of disaster operations. They are important in understanding the constraints on the network. They are usually developed in an effort to facilitate action under stress; however, they may also inhibit the full exchange of information and resources with other organizations in the network by excluding others from the exchange.
Of the 35 cliques identified, the largest number, 11, or 31.4%, represented interactions among federal and local agencies. The next largest subset of cliques included 5, or 14.3%, organizations that involved the interactions at the state and local level. Only 4 cliques, or 11.4%, involved the interactions among federal, state, and local agencies that was the intent of the National Incident Management System adopted by the DHS (2004) . An equal number, 4 cliques, or 11.4%, engaged in interactions among local agencies. Only 2 cliques represented interactions among federal and state agencies, a finding that confirms the gap between plans and practice. Three cliques involved only federal agencies, and the remaining cliques represented singular types of interaction. The number of cliques in this large network also indicates the difficulty of enabling collective action across the network.
Discussion
Five observations are significant from this analysis. First, the findings reveal a striking pattern of asymmetry in the communication processes among the organizations participating in response operations. Despite the explicit intent to build collaborative relationships across jurisdictional levels in disaster response, as stated in the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System (FEMA, 2004) , the network of actors identified for the Katrina response system showed only modest levels of interaction across all four jurisdictional levels. The news reports document a higher degree of action at the local level, with federal agencies providing assistance directly to local agencies without coordinating their actions through state agencies. This pattern of performance makes it extremely difficult to develop the "common operating picture" of needs and resources that is so essential to effective emergency management across all jurisdictional levels.
Second, the severity of disruption in the communications infrastructure seriously hampered the responsible organizations' capacity to anticipate the level of destruction and illustrated the need to build technical support for organizational action in disaster response. The catastrophic failure in organizational response to the needs of the communities of the Gulf Coast reflects vividly the sociotechnical nature of disaster response. The technical infrastructure is critical to support the organizational infrastructure, and the performance of either one must be assessed in relation to the performance of the other.
Third, the information infrastructure needed to support organizational performance in a rapidly changing environment must be established prior to the disaster. The information needs for managing a disaster over a large regional scale escalate proportionally to the number of communities and the size of the communities exposed to risk. Creating a regional knowledge base to areas exposed to the same risk, such as hurricanes for the five states that ring the Gulf Coast, is central to achieving coordination when hazards strike. It is a long-term effort that requires a continuing commitment to update and upgrade the capacity of practicing managers to function in their specific areas of responsibility, while simultaneously adjusting their performance to the constraints and resources available in neighboring jurisdictions. Without current knowledge of risks and resources, actual performance under stress of disaster is almost certain to fail.
Fourth, the interdependence between social and technical systems in managing disaster risk is such that the two sets of systems are best conceived as functioning as an integrated sociotechnical system. The technical system is designed to support the organizational system by monitoring hazards, maintaining records of actions taken, and anticipating future problems. The organizational system, in turn, is needed to maintain the technical system and overcome the vulnerabilities, bias, and human error that creep into the management of disaster events. The integration of the two types into a genuine sociotechnical system offers a powerful mechanism for reducing disaster risk.
Finally, given the complexity and cost of managing catastrophic disasters, it is critical to strengthen the capacity for self-organization at every level of management and operations. One can envision communication processes occurring more effectively along a diagonal that crosses jurisdictional and sectoral lines than in a standard hierarchical format. The disaster response network identified from news reports shows the potential for this kind of self organizing system. A well-designed communications and information infrastructure would contribute substantially to achieving that goal. Enabling communities to manage their own risk more efficiently and effectively needs to be established as a primary goal of disaster risk reduction. Comfort, Haase / HURRICANE KATRINA AND COMMUNICATION 339 
